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Digitalization of information across organizations has made information exchange between organizations easier. 
Information exchange, however, requires governmental organizations to define security policies, stating which 
information can be accessed, processed and indexed by which organizations, when, where and how. Ensuring that the 
information, once exchanged, stays up-to-date is a real challenge, as is enforcement of the security policies. This paper 
proposes the use of Distributed Digital Dossier in combination with agent technology to enforce these requirements. 
The domain of a Court of Law is taken as an example to illustrate the approach. 
 
1. Introduction 
Information in large governmental organizations is inherently distributed across different physical locations and 
systems.  As much of this information is digital, distribution of information has become easier. Distribution, however, 
requires governmental organizations to define policies, stating which information can be accessed, processed and 
indexed by which other organizations, when, where and how. Ensuring that the information, once distributed to other 
organizations, remains up to date is a real challenge. Staleness of information can have serious consequences: especially 
when organizations act on the basis of information that is not only stale, but also invalid.  Security policies within each 
of the individual organizations specify the rights and regulations for all entities involved specifying, for example, which 
information may be exchanged by whom, with whom and how, and how integrity is to be ascertained. 
This paper introduces the notion of a distributed digital dossier. Responsibility for data is delegated to authorities 
responsible for data provision.  The digital dossier currently being evaluated in a pilot study by the Courts of Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam in the Netherlands is an example of a dossier that contains information from multiple sources, and for 
which security is a major challenge.  The Public Prosecution is responsible for dossier compilation and management – 
the dossiers are criminal files. Information is acquired from governmental organizations such as the Police, Prison 
Authorities, Municipals, and Probation Officers. Administrative data such as name, address and marital status, for 
example, is provided by the Municipalities, the authority responsible for registration of this information.  The 
Municipalities have well-regulated policies with respect to information provision.  Their security policies specify which 
information is accessible to whom and when and which information is not. 
 If information changes during the course of file compilation, the criminal file should be adapted. Correctly 
propagating new information between different sources is, however, often complex. For this reason, in practice the 
Public Prosecution most often assumes that information does not change during file compilation and between file 
compilation and a court case. As a result information can become stale.  A distributed digital dossier provides the means  
to propagate changes in data at the source (the responsible authority) to the files in which this information has been 
included. 
A conceptual overview of the distributed digital dossier is detailed in Section 2.  Section 3 provides an example of a 
distributed criminal file for a specific class of crimes – those committed by juvenile repeat offender. Section 4 uses this 




2. Distributed Digital Dossiers 
A distributed digital dossier [6] contains information from physically distributed sources, distributed across 
organizational boundaries, see Figure 1. Initialization of a digital dossier is the responsibility of the Public Prosecution. 
The initial dossier specifies which information is to be included on the basis of the crime committed. It also specifies 
other meta-data such as the access control list (who may read and alter which parts of the dossier),  dependencies 
between different fields in a document, the organizations responsible for the fields. This part of the dossier is stored 
centrally by the Public Prosecution, in their own database.  The content of different fields, represented as records, are the 
responsibility of the organizations specified in the central document: personal information is maintained by the 
municipal databases, family related information for juveniles is maintained by Council for Child Welfare etc. The 
dossier stored by the Public Prosecution only contains references to this information. The information itself is controlled 
by the source (from the perspective of the Public Prosecution). If something changes at the source, this is flagged by the 
responsible organization, and the Public Prosecution is informed. The Public Prosecution then, on the basis of the meta-
information on dependencies between fields, checks to make sure the data within the dossier is still consistent. 
 
 
This guarantees that information stays as up-to-date as possible during dossier compilation. The distributed character 
of the dossier, however, vanishes, by necessity, once the dossier is sent to Court. The Public Prosecutor’s task is namely 
to compile a dossier. Once a dossier is finalized, however, and sent to Court and the defendant’s lawyer the dossier needs 
to be static. Only via a special procedure and with the judge’s permission, can information be added to the dossier. This 
ensures that all parties have the same information. Note that a finalized (or frozen [6]) dossier is a local copy of the 
distributed file at that given point in time. 
The next section presents an example of a case and some snippets of the corresponding dossier. It concerns a case 
involving juvenile repeat offenders. This type of case has been chosen because of the number and nature of organizations 
involved. 
3. An example criminal prosecution chain: Juvenile Repeat Offenders 
An example of a criminal prosecution chain for a juvenile repeat offender is illustrated below. This example has been 
previously been used in [7] and is constructed from an actual case. All personal information has been anonymized and 
numerous details have been omitted. However it does illustrate the complexities involved in such cases. Note that this 
scenario describes the current Dutch situation, legal constraints are also analyzed in a Dutch legal setting, according to 
Dutch law. 
      
 
Figure 1.  The Digital Dossier depends on information from numerous 




The criminal prosecution chain starts when the Police arrest a juvenile suspect for vandalism.  The suspect is escorted 
to the Police station where an assistant prosecutor questions the suspect. The Police open a new dossier specifically for 
this case.  This dossier contains a summary of the offence for which the suspect is charged, the date and location of the 
incident, number of suspects, personal data of the victim, the official police report, and other relevant information.  The 
suspect then becomes the subject of investigation: the personal data he/she has provided is cross referenced with the 
municipal database1. The Police also queries local Repeat Offender Databases to discover whether this suspect is a 
known repeat offender. As this case concerns a minor, a request is issued to other organizations for juvenile offenders, to 
provide relevant information about the minor's background. All of this information is added to the Police report. After 
collecting this information, the Police and the Assistant Prosecutor inform the Public Prosecutor of the case and transfer 
the report.  
The Public Prosecutor decides whether to press charges or to pursue an alternative if other (minor) punishment is 
deemed more suitable. This decision is based both on the specific details of the current case and the(criminal) history of 
the offender. A dedicated Judicial Documentation Database is used to retrieve information on the criminal past of the 
suspect. Typically, at this point, the Public Prosecutor will again consult municipal databases and local Juvenile Repeat 
Offender Systems. All information is cross referenced with the case dossier and information is updated when needed. If 
the Public Prosecutor decides to bring the case to court, as is the case, the Public Prosecution’s criminal file is created 
with this information. The next mandatory step involves informing the Council for Child Welfare.  
In the Dutch context the Council for Child Welfare has the task to investigate all crimes of minors. In addition to the 
criminal offences of the minor, the family situation and other relevant social factors are taken into account. This results 
in a motivated advice for suitable punishment of the suspect. This advice is added to the dossier. The prosecutor then 
serves a summons and a lawyer is assigned to the juvenile suspect. Adding the summons to the dossier finalizes the 
dossier at this point. A copy of the dossier is sent to the Court and to the lawyer of the suspect. At the court session the 
information in the dossier is used by all parties involved. The Public Prosecutor demands a suitable sentence, the lawyer 
presents the defense and ultimately the judge comes to a verdict.  The suspect is now sentenced and all information 
regarding the court session is added to the dossier. The dossier itself is filed in the Judicial Documentation Database for 
future reference. 
4. System Architecture 
Distributed digital dossiers can be implemented in several ways. A distributed database [3] is an obvious option.  As 
the digital dossier, however, not only needs to store information, but to actively monitor all fields continuously, to 
autonomously act when changes occur, across different organizations each with their own security policies, to guarantee 
up-to-date-ness, consistency, completeness and security of the data another approach has been chosen: an agent-based 
approach. Agents provide the means for decentralized autonomous monitoring and processing of data, coordination 
mechanisms, and interaction support. A light weight `skeleton’ framework using XML for the dossiers themselves in 
combination with agent technology [1,2] ensures the more complex and dynamic properties such as completeness etc. 
4.1. Digital Dossier Skeleton 
As stated above the dossier created by the Public Prosecution specifies which information is to be included and its 
status (mandatory, optional), which dependencies between information exist, which organizations are responsible for 
which information, which access rights are assigned to whom/which organizations, etc.  This meta-data depends on the 
crime committed.  This paper assumes that standard XML templates exist for each class of problems, and that these 
templates are used by the Public Prosecution to structure the meta-data in a dossier. Figure 2 depicts an example of part 
of a dossier with both meta-data and data provided by the Public Prosecution.  Meta-data includes the dossier number, 
creation date, type of offence and access control lists.  The example depicted in Figure 2 specifies that in this case the 
dossier has been opened by the Public Prosecution of Amsterdam on the first of July 2007. The offence committed is 
shoplifting, and the offender is a juvenile repeat offender.  This dossier also specifies that four named employees of the 
Public Prosecution have been assigned permission to read this document (identified in this example by numbers 
1234,2345,3456,4567)  and that only two of these four employees have permission to edit parts of the dossier (i.e. 
write permission).  
                                                           
1 In the Dutch setting municipals are obliged by Law to maintain databases with personal information on citizens. This information is then used by 




This template distinguishes between mandatory and optional information for a specific crime. This information 
represents the knowledge used by the Public Prosecution to check completeness of a dossier  - and provides the structure 
needed for automated completeness checks [7]. Certain information must always be included in a dossier, such as the 
suspect’s personal data, and the original police report concerning an incident. Other information will only be mandatory 
for certain types of offences and/or suspects. In this particular example, independent of the crime for which the suspect 
has been accused, the suspect is a juvenile: according to Dutch law, a report by the Council for Child Welfare is 
mandatory. Other information, however, is optional. In this example, footage of the incident on the basis of which the 
suspect has been charged, recorded by a video surveillance camera, may be included. Note that a court case can only 
commence if all mandatory information is included in a dossier.  
The document also contains a number of references, indicated by the ‘ref:’ keyword, to other documents and their 
source.  In this example references local to the Public Prosecution (PP) are the suspect’s original statement (ref:PP-
00001statement.pdf) and the video evidence (ref:PP-00001-movie1.avi and ref:PP-00001-
movie2.avi). References to  XML documents to be provided by other organizations, in this example, include the 
(national) Council for Child Welfare (ref:CCW-234567) and the Municipal database of Amsterdam 
(ref:MuniDatAmsterdam-123456).   
Figure 3 depicts the data to which the ref ref:MuniDatAmsterdam-123456 refers, the suspect’s personal data 
as stored and maintained by the Municipality – in this case the Municipality of Amsterdam.  For the sake of simplicity, 
this information is assumed to be stored in the same format as the XML document stored by the Public Prosecution. 




  <MetaData> 
    <Ref>PubProsAmsterdam-00001</Ref> 
    <CreationDate>1-7-2007</CreationDate> 
   <Offence> 
    <Main>Shoplifting</Main> 
    <Category>JuvenileRepeatOffender</Category> 
   </Offence> 
    <Access> 
       <Read>1234,2345,3456,4567</Read> 
       <Write>1234,4567</Write> 
    </Access> 
    …     
  </MetaData> 
  <Records> 
    <MandatoryInfo> 
      <PersonalInfo>ref:MuniDatAmsterdam-123456</PersonalInfo> 
      <ReportCCW>ref:CCW-234567</ReportCCW> 
      … 
    </MandatoryInfo> 
    <OptionalInfo> 
      <StatementSupect>ref:PP-00001statement.pdf</StatementSuspect> 




      … 
    </OptionalInfo> 
  </Records> 
</Dossier> 
 





  <MetaData> 
    <Ref>MuniDataAmsterdam-123456</Ref> 
    <CreationDate>05-08-1993</CreationDate> 
    <Access> 
       <Read>All</Read> 
       <Write>09876</Write> 
    </Access> 
    …     
  </MetaData> 
  <Records> 
    <MandatoryInfo> 
 <Name> 
   <Surname>Jan</Surname> 





 …       
    </MandatoryInfo> 
    <OptionalInfo></OptionalInfo> 
  </Records> 
</Dossier> 
 
Figure 3.  Example of personal information stored at the 
municipal database.   
 
The data depicted in Figure 3 states that this record may be read by all Dutch governmental organizations, but that 
only one employee, the employee of the Municipality of Amsterdam with identifier 09876, can alter the file. This is a 
policy that is controlled by the local organizations (the Municipality of Amsterdam). Note that although organizations 
are independent entities, they do not always have complete freedom in setting their own security policies. In certain 
cases they are legally obliged (by Dutch Law) to provide information to specific authorities on request. In other cases  
Dutch Law imposes restrictions on database access, e.g. due to privacy regulations. The ability to add/modify 
information is typically controlled by the organizations themselves. Note also that the information provided by the 
Municipality in the document depicted in Figure 3 again makes the distinction between mandatory and optional 
information without more detail. It could, although this is not shown in Figure 3, also have contained references to other 
documents, stored either locally or at another organization.  
A distributed digital dossier thus consists of a number of documents in a networked structure distributed over 
physically distributed locations with a central coordinator. Note that digital dossiers always form the root of this 
network, i.e. digital dossiers are not included in (referenced from) other documents, unless the referring document is also 
a digital dossier. This ensures that digital dossiers themselves (e.g. as shown in Figure 2) are always controlled by the 
Public Prosecution, an important security requirement. The next section discusses the infrastructure used to link these 
documents together. 
4.2. Multi Agent Systems 
As described above, a distributed digital dossier is, in fact, a distributed XML document. The Public Prosecution 
maintains the defining document, multiple other organizations maintain the information for which they are responsible.  
Each of these organizations is assumed to have defined their own security policies. Nothing has, however, been said 
about the underlying technology. An infrastructure is needed to link the organizations together, making information 
exchange possible. 
The multi-agent paradigm provides a conceptual modeling framework for such systems. Agents are pro-active, adapt 
to a changing world and can be mobile [8]. Agent systems have a conceptually clear model for autonomous systems that 
 
 
supports modularity, security and scalability. Specific tasks can be implemented by dedicated agents, allowing for a clear 
separation of concerns and straightforward integration of new functionality as new agents.  
 Agent technology provides a means to implement large scale distributed autonomous systems [2].  Agents interact 
through message passing.  Agents run on agent platforms.  An agent platform is a dedicated middleware layer that 
provides the infrastructure, such as secure communication, resource management, mobility2 and access control, for 
software agents. The agent platform middleware also ensures that multiple hosts within a location can be viewed as one 
logical unit, each with their own security policies. 
The agent based architecture designed for the distributed digital dossier assumes that the agent locations are the 
organizations involved. Thus the Public Prosecution, the Municipal databases and the Council for Child Welfare (and all 
other organizations) are locations, each running their own agent platform middleware supporting their own 




The agent platform middleware facilitates a uniform software layer across locations. Access to the digital dossier is 
also provided by this layer. For each location the part of the digital dossier that the organization controls will be 
accessible via the agent platform middleware, thus providing a distributed digital dossier. 
Dedicated agents per organization access their parts of the dossier and keep information up-to-date.  The Public 
Prosecution has agents for more complicated tasks such as completeness and consistency checking. Dedicated software 
agents perform such tasks as guarding consistency both within a source and between sources within the digital dossier, 
and notifying appropriate (human) parties when needed. With respect to completeness dedicated agents monitor the 
availability of necessary documents in the digital dossier. For instance, a trial cannot start if a copy of the original police 
report is not in the digital dossier. Software agents guard such completeness issues [7]. 
In a future design the mapping from a specific ontology at one organization to the shared ontology of the digital 
dossier will be done automatically. However, this is not the main focus of this paper and for now it is assumed that all 
(governmental) organizations share one common ontology. 
4.3. Guarding Timeliness 
                                                           
2 Not all agent systems allow migration of agents between hosts. 
 
 
                   
 
 




The design of the distributed digital dossier ensures that information will stay as up to date as possible. Agents, 
however, also perform many other functional tasks such as checking consistency or completeness, but also enforcing 
access control or handling automatic backups. An example of a functional task for which a dedicated agent provides a 
transparent implementation is that of guarding expiration dates. Specific to the domain of a Court of Law is the example 
of expiration of criminal files for juvenile offenders after they reach the age of 18. By Dutch law information provided 
by the Council for Child Welfare may not be used by the Public Prosecution (or any other organization for that matter) 
after the suspect turns 18, or after a period of 5 years, if no other offence has been committed.  
Dedicated agents at the Public Prosecution guard the timeliness of information in the dossier. In the example of the 
juvenile repeat offender, the dedicated agent can remove (independently) the reference to the information stored at the 
Council of Child Welfare without human intervention, once the suspect turns 18 if all other constraints are fulfilled. The 
Public Prosecutor of the case and the Council for Child Welfare are notified that the information in the dossier can no 
longer be used. This ensures that the dossier stays up to date (does not contain information that can no longer be used), 
without actually deleting information (as only the reference is removed). The Council for Child Welfare can have its 
own (security) policy that states what needs to be done once information can no longer be used. This may well differ 
from the policies implemented by the Public Prosecution 
4.4. Security Policy 
The sensitive nature of the information in a dossier makes security very important. Ensuring that only authorized 
persons are allowed to read/write/alter the dossier is clearly important, as are other security issues such as integrity of 
data, secure backups, accountability and privacy. All of these security issues are specified in a security policy: a 
document that explicitly states the restrictions posed on a system in order to make it secure. The security architecture 
proposed for the distributed digital dossier is based on the design in which (1) agents control all access to the digital 
dossier and (2) security policies are defined for each organization (each organization can use its own security policies).  
Under normal circumstances3, all interactions with a dossier are performed via agents. Agents are bound to specific 
users/employees of the organizations involved. Thus, individual users have their own agent(s) to act on their behalf. A 
highly ranked legal clerk employed by the Public Prosecution, for example, may have an agent that has the right to 
change all information maintained by the Public Prosecution in the central digital dossier. Another clerk, employed by 
the Municipality of Amsterdam, may have an agent whose’s only task is to flag and communicate modifications to a 
suspect’s data to the dossier’s consistency agent at the Public Prosecution.  This use of agents for access to the dossier is 
implicit, users are not continually aware of their agents’ state.  They interact with their agents through standard 
interfaces. The access control token of a user, such as the legal clerk, is a combination of a password and public key 
(X509) certificate. The agent uses the password and certificate to authenticate itself to the system, thereby also 
authenticating the user in whose behalf the agent acts. Agents can be linked to any legal entity, not just users of the 
system, but also organizations. The Public Prosecution can thus use its own agents. The mapping to a legal entity is 
however crucial, as  it needs to be clear who is accountable for mistakes and/or malicious behavior.  Agents are bound to 
a legal entity by signing the agents’ code with the private key that corresponds with the users’ public key certificates. 
The other main security attribute is that each organization uses its own security policy. Security policies state rules for 
all security related issues. Some of these can be global, that is, for all organizations that provide information to the 
digital dossier. An example is the authentication described above: all users of the system have to use a combination of a 
password and certificate to authenticate themselves. Another example is the use of one shared lookup service that can be 
used to find individual agents within an agent system. However, most rules in the security policy are local: the local 
organization controls who has access to its files, but also which  backup procedures is used, what the privacy policy 
regarding its data is, etc. This ensures that if the computer system of one organization is comprised the other 
organizations in the semi-open system are not at risk. In particular, as long as the computer system of the Public 
Prosecution is not compromised, the digital dossier can still be used. The computer systems of the Public Prosecution 
need to be trusted completely (for 100%). The  lookup service, PKI service and authentication mechanism are all hosted 
by the Public Prosecution. If other systems are compromised the digital dossier is not necessarily effected. Automatic 
consistency checking, performed each time part of a dossier is altered, detects modifications.  If these modifications are 
unwarranted, the original data may be restored. See [6] for a more detailed discussion of the security architecture 
designed for the distributed digital dossier.     
                                                           
3 System administrators can access the system manually, when necessary. Sometimes this is required, for example, when a backup copy needs to be 
replaced, or an operating system has to be upgraded. 
 
 
4.5. Semi-open Systems 
Information in a dossier comes from many different sources: the combined systems of the courts, the public 
prosecution, the police and all other parties together form a semi-open system.  Not quite an open system, nor a 
completely closed system. An open system is a computer system that is configured to allow public access to outside 
parties.  In contrast, a closed system only allows (partial) access to known authorized users and their agents. The systems 
involved in the compilation and maintenance of  a digital dossier, are neither closed nor open: the system as a whole is 
semi-open. The rights of individual users are determined by each of the organizations separately., Each organization has 
its own security policy.  The users and their agents do not have direct access to each others databases.  Each individual 
organization is responsible for its own systems, and information provision. In this semi-open environment all systems 
are trusted and known. 
Each of the organization's own computer systems can be seen as a closed systems. Only police officers can access the 
computer system used by the Police and only employees of the Public Prosecution can access (parts of) dossiers at the 
Public Prosecution. However, as all of these systems (can) exchange information, the network of systems is no longer a 
closed system. The characteristics of each site can vary considerably: they can have different procedures for access, 
reliability and/or security.  For example, a Municipal Database that contains name and address information has other 
goals (and hence system characteristics) than a computer system used by the Council for Child Welfare that stores 
information on children. Thus the system as a whole constitutes an example of a semi-open system. 
Semi-open systems are challenging for numerous reasons. The security policies in such a system cannot be too 
restrictive, because they also contain public information. Yet it is clear that the privacy sensitive information concerning 
criminal records and other personal information needs to be guarded as well [5]. Privacy sensitive data needs to  be 
protected against malicious intent and at the same time less sensitive information needs to be made available to a larger 
public.  Such systems generally tend to make all data harder to access, including the less sensitive information that can 
be of interest to a large public. This phenomenon is known as `label creep' in literature [4]. Finding an optimal security 
policy in such a setting is domain dependant and will typically be a tradeoff between security and usability. It is 
important to keep the dual characteristic of such a system into mind when designing such a security policy. 
5. Conclusions 
Distributed digital dossiers have clear benefits for keeping data up to date and consistent across multiple 
organizations organized in semi-open environments without duplicating large dossiers continually. Organizations 
determine their own (local) security policies while still exchanging information in a transparent and efficient way. The 
added advantages of using agent systems in this setting include the option to transparently implement complex 
functional tasks such as monitoring, consistency, completeness and security with dedicated agents per organization. 
Current work includes the implementation of a prototype system using the Public Prosecution’s simulation 
environment, implementing different security policies for different organizations. From a legal perspective research 
focuses on analysis of legal constraints with respect to integration of the individual systems as determined by (Dutch) 
law. More research is needed to answer these and other questions.  
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